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Abstract: In developing countries, innovation is to a large extent a matter of adoption 
of advanced technologies but also of conducting internal R&D to be able to better 
assimilate existing technologies. This paper, based on firm level data from 24 developing 
countries, examines the roles of internal R&D efforts (MAKE) and external technology 
sourcing (BUY) in fostering productivity in manufacturing firms. Is MAKE a substitute 
for BUY or are the two strategies complementary as evidenced in some developed 
countries? Our empirical investigation highlights the critical role of external technology 
acquisition in manufacturing industries in low-income countries and exhibits signs of 
complementarity only in middle-income countries.  
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1. Introduction  
Much of the economic and social progress of the past few centuries has benefited from 
technological progress. Innovation has been considerably discussed in the endogenous 
growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Grossman and Helpman, 1991), where it is 
modelled as being driven by an R&D sector. Although the number of studies examining 
the influence of innovation on productivity is increasing, most of the empirical studies on 
innovation and productivity have been conducted on developed country data (see Mairesse 
et al., 2011 for a review). In developing countries, innovation is more a process of learning 
and assimilation of knowledge in an effort to catch-up with the technological frontier than 
a process of creation and discovery (Fransman and King, 1984).  
The current study will focus on knowledge sourcing strategies in developing countries. 
Two types of technology sourcing are distinguished. Firms can obtain new technologies by 
conducting their own R&D (MAKE) or they can acquire new technologies through 
licensing, hiring new personnel, or investing in new machinery (BUY). We shall address 
two questions:  What are the comparative returns of the two sources of knowledge? And 
are the two substitutes or complements, i.e. is there a choice between one or the other, or 
should they be conducted jointly? 
The analysis is based on firm level data from 24 low- and middle-income countries1. We 
test the existence of complementarity between MAKE and BUY by estimating demand 
equations for the two knowledge sourcing strategies, which are derived from a production 
function that allows for a synergy between them. This way of testing for complementarity, 
which is borrowed from Miravete and Pernías (2006), allows the separate identification of 
a synergy between the two strategies and the unexplained correlation between the error 
terms in the respective demand equations. The result suggests that firms in low-income 
countries rely more on external sourcing and firms in middle-income countries more on 
in-house R&D, while a synergy between internal and external knowledge sourcing exists in 
middle-income countries but not in low-income countries. 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets the background by reviewing the 
feature of innovation strategies in developing countries and existing evidence on 
complementarity in innovation studies. Section 3 presents the empirical model and 
                                                        
1 The classification into middle-income and low-income countries is taken from “World Bank country 
classification 2011”. See footnote 12.  
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methods to test for complementarity. The data and the variables used will be presented in 
section 4. The results are interpreted in section 5. The last section summarises and 
concludes.  
 
2. MAKE and BUY in developing countries: complements or substitutes? 
2.1 Something more than R&D? 
Cooper (1989) explained the differences in characteristics between innovation in 
industrialized economies and developing countries. As he pointed out it is a rather limited 
view of innovation theories to be only concerned with the initial introduction of products 
or processes. Most firms in developing countries attempt to reach the technological 
frontier instead of achieving inventions that are new to the market.  
At a low stage of development, firms normally face obstacles such as inadequate human 
capital and poor infrastructure. In-house innovative activities are severely constrained for a 
majority of firms. Freeman (1989) suggested that external knowledge sourcing has a 
significant influence on the learning process. He argued that for the most part even the 
most technologically advanced firms in developing countries are committed to be involved 
in external sourcing activities. Aggarwal (2000) explained that external technology plays 
two important roles in developing economies: filling gaps in domestic technological 
capability and upgrading the existing technologies to international standards. By enhancing 
the technological capability, external technology sourcing benefits in-house R&D. 
However, acquiring external knowledge per se does not guarantee that a firm will achieve 
successful learning (Matusik, 2000). For external knowledge to be exploited effectively, it 
has to be combined with a complementary knowledge base within the firm. Cooper (1989) 
mentioned that failure to learn is in fact quite common in developing countries because the 
firms there that receive technology via external sources are quite often unconcerned about 
how to develop and appropriate this internal technological capability. Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989) define “absorptive capacity” to describe the substantial role of a stock of prior 
knowledge in order to absorb external know-how. They argue that the in-house R&D 
process would at the same time accommodate firms to build up their own technological 
capability. This technological capability within firms is needed in order to understand the 
tacit components of the technology (Desai, 1989; Lall, 1989; Mowery and Oxley, 1995). 
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The paradigm of open innovation demonstrated that firms should make the best use of 
internal and external knowledge (Chesbrough, 2003). This perspective not only emphasizes 
the significant value of external knowledge, it also indicates that firms organize their 
internal R&D in part in order to absorb the wealth of available external knowledge. Such a 
mutual interaction implies the possible complementary between own and external sources 
of knowledge.  
2.2 Definition of complementarity  
A pair of economic activities is complementary if (1) adopting one activity does not 
preclude adopting the other and if (2) whenever it is possible to implement each activity 
separately, the sum of the benefits of doing each separately is not greater than the benefit 
of doing both together (Milgrom and Robert; 1990). The theorem states that if each pair of 
activities in a group is complementary, then implementing any subset of the activities in 
the group raises the incremental return to implementing the remaining ones (Topkis 1978). 
This notion of complementarity between activities was first introduced in economics by 
Vives (1990) and then further developed by Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995). 
More formally, suppose there are two discrete technology acquisition practices, MAKE 
and BUY. Z is a vector of exogenous variables. The objective function f(MAKE, BUY, Z) 
is supermodular if the following inequality holds for all values of the other arguments of f: 
f(1, 1; Z) - f(1, 0; Z) > f(0,1;Z) - f(0, 0; Z)                                                                   (1) 
MAKE and BUY are complementary if the presence of one strategy (e.g. MAKE) 
increases the marginal return of adopting the other strategy (BUY), after controlling for 
other exogenous effects2 (Milgrom and Robert, 1990). Conversely, MAKE and BUY are 
substitutes if the inverse inequality holds for (1).  
2.3 Evidence of complementarity in innovation studies 
The notion of complementarity is commonly refer to cross-price effects in demand theory. 
During the past decades, many studies have broadened this concept to analyse more 
complex economic phenomena, organizational structures and government policies. Here, 
                                                        
2 If  MAKE and BUY are continuous variables, an equivalent inequality restriction would imply that the 
incremental effect of  one practice on the objective function increases with an increase in the other practice.  
 2 f (rb,rm ,Z)
rbrm  0
  ; where rb is BUY and rm is MAKE 
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we briefly review some key studies in both economic and management literature that have 
estimated the complementarity versus substitutability in ways of technology sourcing.  
In emerging economies, complementarity in innovation mainly focuses on investigating 
the inter-dependent relation between in-house R&D and imported technology. Braga and 
Willmore (1991) found that there is a robust complementary relationship between 
technology buying and firm technology effort in Brazilian industry. Deolalikar and 
Evenson (1989) showed that technology transferred from abroad and in-house R&D are 
complementary rather than substitutive avenues of technology acquisition. Kim and 
Nelson (2000) also argued that the process of learning through the external technology 
sourcing serves as an effective experience that paves the way for indigenous technological 
innovation in Indian firms.  
Besides, complementarity in innovation has also been shared by lots of studies across 
developed economies. Arora and Gambardella (1990) test the synergetic effects among 
four different external sourcing strategies of large American chemical and pharmaceutical 
firms. The results show that there is complementarity between all types of external 
sourcing strategies. Veugelers (1997) finds that the external sourcing strategy stimulates 
internal research activities in Belgian manufacturing firms. It seems that external 
knowledge sources leverage the innovative power of in-house R&D. This result is also 
found in a study undertaken by Lokshin, Belderbos and Carree (2008). In a recent study 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) found a strong synergy relationship between firms’ internal 
R&D and disembodied knowledge sourcing strategies in Belgian manufacturing firms.  
On the other hand, some studies have found evidence on substitutability between 
innovation activities. Mytelka (1987) found that external imports of technology discourage 
Andean group countries to undertake in-house innovation activities. Fikkert (1993) used 
the Indian manufacturing firm data to regress the technology imports on in-house R&D 
efforts. Their findings support the hypothesis of negative relationship between technology 
imports and R&D efforts. Basant and Fikkert (1996) estimated the return of R&D, 
technology imports and their interaction term in the production function by using Indian 
firm level panel data. They found that the estimated rate of return of technology imports is 
much higher than the return to in-house R&D. The results also imply a substitutive 
relation between R&D efforts and external technology in the production of knowledge. 
Katrak (1997) also found that the probability of importing technology was only weakly 
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influenced by R&D efforts and the external sourcing had a significant negative effect on 
the R&D labour intensity in Indian electrical and electronics industries. 
Despite the rich literature on technology making and buying in developing countries, the 
results are far from conclusive. What distinguishes this study from the previous studies is, 
first of all, the use of a recent methodology for testing complementarity that controls for 
the correlation between unobservables in the strategy equations, and, secondly, the use of a 
unique dataset of 24 developing countries that allows to investigate differences in 
complementarity at different levels of development.  
 
3. Testing for complementarity  
In this section we explain the way complementarity in technology acquisition strategies can 
be identified and tested.  
In empirical studies, the most popular approach applied to investigate complementarity 
between economic activities consists in directly estimating the cross partial derivatives in 
the production function. This approach is defined as the Production approach (PROD). It 
aims at testing the complementarily for a specific objective function. It has been applied in 
several empirical studies (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Mohnen and Röller, 2005; 
Belderbos et al., 2006).  
Suppose that a firm uses two knowledge acquisition strategies, ymi, referring to MAKE or 
internal knowledge acquisition, and ybj, referring to BUY or external knowledge 
acquisition. The technology is represented by a standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function Qi = f(Ki, Li, ymi, ybi, Zi), where K and L represent respectively capital and labour, 
and Z stands for a group of control variables that capture the firm- and organization-
specific characteristics. In logarithmic terms, denoting logarithmically transformed 
continuous variables by small letters, we have 
iimibimibimibimibiiii eZyyyyyyyylkq   11011000 )1()1()1)(1(                (2) 
where and   are the output elasticities of capital and labour, yji (j=b,m) are binary 
choice variables taking the value 1 if the corresponding strategies are adopted by firm i, 11, 
01, 10, and 00   capture the productivity obtained when respectively MAKE and BUY, 
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only BUY, only MAKE and neither MAKE nor BUY are chosen, and eit is a random error 
term. 
The PROD approach estimates the existence of complementarity directly by regressing the 
objective function on exclusive combinations of innovation activities. The production 
function is supermodular in ybi and ymi if 
11 - 01 - 10 + 00> 0.                                                                                                       (3) 
The inequality expresses the fact that the presence of one innovation activity increases the 
marginal return of adopting another activity. Conversely, the two activities are substitutive 
if  
11 - 01 - 10 + 00< 0.                                                                                                       (4) 
An alternative form can be written in the follow way:  
iimibibmmimbibiii eZyyyylkq   0                                                             (5) 
where 
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Coefficient m captures the non-exclusive partial effects of MAKE, b the non-exclusive 
partial effect of BUY, bm the returns of adopting MAKE and BUY together; 0 is 
constant. The condition for supermodularity now simplifies to: 
001100011  bm                                                                                                  (7) 
It is worth noting under (5) the marginal returns to either MAKE or BUY will not be 
constant anymore if complementarity or substitutability is observed (bm  0). Henceforth, 
the marginal returns of MAKE and BUY should be expressed respectively as 
mbmbbb
bbmmmm
yyfyf
yyfyf
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Athey and Stern (1998) explain that simply running OLS on the above function would 
deliver inconsistent results. They argue that the existence of firms’ unobserved 
heterogeneity correlated with the strategy decisions may make the PROD approach fail to 
generate consistent estimators.  
In order to correct for this bias, one should either use instrument variables with cross 
sectional data or neutralize the unobserved heterogeneity if panel data are available 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) have tried to adopt instrumental 
variables that were correlated with the adoption decisions without affecting innovation 
output. However, the results can be refined only if the instrumental variables are properly 
identified. In the current case, neither the input price (especially for BUY) that each firm 
faces in adopting innovation practices nor factors that affect the return to those practices 
are observed by the econometrician.  
In the following part, we introduce another approach of testing for complementarity, 
which was originally developed by Miravete and Pernías (2006 and 2010) and later 
extended in Kretschmer, Miravete and Pernías (2012). This approach tests for 
“behavioural complementarity” and can be classified somewhere between the PROD 
approach introduced above and what is known in the literature as the CORR approach. 
The latter tests whether there remains a correlation between the error terms of the reduced 
forms of two strategy equations, which are derived without necessarily specifying any 
objective function. In contrast, in the Miravete and Pernías (MP) approach we specify an 
objective function, although in the end the estimation is based on the parameterization of 
the individual returns of each strategy.3 Compared to the PROD approach we model 
explicitly the endogeneity of the strategy choices4. Apart from not specifying an objective 
function, the CORR approach imposes two assumptions: firms are assumed to make 
rational choices and there are no correlations between the unobserved factors that affect 
the activities concerned. The MP approach differs from the CORR approach by releasing 
the second assumption.  
                                                        
3 In Kretschmer, Miravete and Pernías (2012) the objective function is estimated together with the strategy 
choice equations. 
4 The simple version is using the Pearson correlation or conditional correlation between the residuals to 
test for the association between two or more activities. A number of  empirical studies use this approach as 
auxiliary evidence. For example: Arora and Gambardella (1990) introduce a formal analysis of  (CORR) as a 
test for complementarity. Brickley (1995) explicitly uses (CORR) as a test for the comparative static 
predictions of  Holmström and Milgrom (1994) in the context of  franchising contract provisions. A critical 
assumption underlying this approach is the absence of  covariance between the residuals of  the strategy 
equations conditional on the characteristics of  the firm. 
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Here, we start from the production function (8) by introducing both observed and 
unobserved factors, W ji  and  ji  respectively, which are both interacted with input 
strategies MAKE and BUY in determining the productivity performance. The jiW  (j=b,m) 
are observed factors, which capture things like the  firms’ past innovation experience and 
its absorptive capacity, that can influence the return from the corresponding innovation 
strategy. Control variables are defined differently in determining the return of MAKE and 
BUY in order to avoid the identification problem. The ji’s (j=b,m) capture unobserved 
factors that can influence the choice of MAKE and/or BUY, such as the appropriation 
regime or management practices, and factors that cannot be quantitatively or qualitatively 
identified. The production function is now given as 
iimimibibmmimbibimibmbibii eZyyWyyWlkq   )()(                    (8) 
Let 
mimmibibbi WW   ;                                                                                                   (9) 
On the right-hand side of equation (8), (bi bm ymi  bi)  and (mi bm ybi  mi) 
measure respectively the percentage differences in productivity level when choosing 1 
instead of 0 for each of the two strategies, holding the other one fixed. Specification (8) is 
borrowed from Lewbel (2007). He shows that a specification like (8) eliminates the 
incoherency and incompleteness problems in simultaneous equations with binary variables, 
by specifying as an objective function that incorporates the individual returns derived from 
each individual strategy. Equation (8) differs from the PROD approach in that it captures 
not only the possible interaction between the input strategy variables and the technological 
capability  ji, but also the potential endogeneity of the strategy choices by including ji , 
which is possibly correlated with jiy . The existence of complementarity can only be 
concluded when controlling for both observed and unobserved characteristics.  
We shall estimate equation (8) by maximum likelihood. Before we derive the likelihood 
function, two important assumptions need to be made. Because of the absence of 
information regarding the cost associated to the two innovation strategies, we are not able 
to derive a cost function, hence we assume that firms behave optimally by maximizing 
their productivity. Second, in order to avoid an identification problem, we assume that the 
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unobserved error terms (bi, mi) follow a standard normal bivariate distribution with a 
correlation coefficient bm . 
The firm has to decide on whether to adopt or not each of the two innovation strategies 
(MAKE and/or BUY). Therefore, four choice combinations are possible: D(1,1), D(1,0), 
D(0,1), D(0,0). The firm will choose the combination that yields the highest productivity. 
For each of the four possible choices we will get a corresponding set of inequality 
restrictions as follows5: 
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If D(1,1) is the optimal choice, the first set of inequality restrictions in (10) automatically 
satisfy the supermodular condition (1). This can be proved by:  
First, adding the first two inequality for D(1,1) in (10), we will have 
04  bmmibimibi  ;                                                                                      (11) 
then rearranging the third inequality of D(1,1) and putting the left sequence to the right,   
02  bmmibimibi  ;                                                                                      (12) 
finally, subtracting (12) from (11), we obtain the supermodularity condition 
                                                        
5 f(ybi, ymi) is derived from equation 8. Here, the form of  D(1,1) is the sum of  returns in choosing both 
MAKE and BUY: (bi bm ymi  bi) + (mi bm ybi mi).  This specific form for D(1,1) enables 
us to avoid the incoherency and incompleteness problems (Lewbel, 2007).  
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D(1,1)D(1,0)  D(0,1) D(0,0)
 (bi  bm  bi) (mi  bm  mi) (bi  bi)  (mi  mi) 0 2bm  0               (13) 
In the structural from, firms need to reach decisions by considering both the expected 
returns of doing MAKE/BUY and their possible synergy. If there is a synergistic effect, 
firms will engage in both activities together and we expect to see the existence of 
complementarity, which will be exhibited as 2δbm > 0. What is important to notice is that 
the estimation will control for the presence of the correlation between error terms, bm , 
which may cause the two strategies to be adopted jointly but for other reasons than 
complementarity between them.   
In order to write the likelihood function, there are three situations that should be 
considered separately. First, if bm = 0, which implies that there is no complementarity 
between MAKE and BUY, (10) will be transformed into a likelihood function that 
corresponds to the standard bivariate probit model. There is no interaction between the 
returns of individual strategies, and hence each strategy is separately chosen depending on 
whether its return is above a certain threshold. Second, if bm > 0, the inequalities for 
D(1,1) and D(0,0) in (10) that are marked with an asterisk are binding. Last, if bm < 0, it is 
the inequalities marked with an asterisk for D(1,0) and D(1,0) in (10) that are binding.  
The likelihood function will reproduce the probability of observing pairs of strategies that 
are determined by the inequality constraints in (10).  
 
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(14) 
where 
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where P(1,1), for instance, denotes the probability of observing the strategy pair (1,1). The 
same goes for the other pairs. In addition to the parameters in the production function (8), 
the correlation coefficient bm will also be estimated. The estimation of a truncated 
bivariate probit with upper and lower bounds is achieved by adopting the maximum 
simulated likelihood estimator using the GHK simulator (Hajivassiliou and Ruud, 1994; 
Greene, 2003).  
 
4. Data and variables 
4.1 Data 
The data that we use in our empirical analysis come from the World Bank Investment 
Climate Surveys (ICS)6. These surveys have been conducted mostly in developing countries 
and provide us a wide range of information about innovative performance, economic 
activities and the investment environment of firms. Several aspects referring to firms’ 
innovation behaviour are covered in the survey, such as firms’ R&D input, licensing and 
other external sourcing channels.  
After removing missing values and cleaning for outliers, we are left with 9,086 firms across 
24 countries in the manufacturing sector in the pooled cross-sectional dataset from the 
period 2002-2005 7 . Due to differences in the size of the economies and the survey 
                                                        
6 For more information and the methodology of  the survey, please see http://www.worldbank.org 
7 We did not use the standardized dataset provided by the World Bank due to inconsistencies in the 
questionnaires and measurements (e.g. currencies). Instead, we cleaned the data country by country 
because the standardized dataset does not always cover all the information provided by firms. Additionally, 
the currency unit in the standardized data also caused some confusion, which needed to be traced back to 
each country’s questionnaire. Furthermore, the service sector is not included because the innovation inputs 
(R&D and external sourcing) are not reported. Furthermore, following Hall and Mairesse (1995), we only 
keep observations for which the capital-labour ratio was within three times the inter-quartile range (the 
  13
methods adopted across countries and regions, the number of firms in the samples varies 
considerably across countries. Only countries with more than 50 observations are 
included 8 . Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the countries and their 
innovativeness. Innovativeness here means having introduced a product or a process 
innovation.  
<Insert table 1 here> 
As shown in table 1, innovation is rather pervasive across countries with approximately 58 
per cent of them claiming to have been innovative during the period under review. It 
should be noted again that these numbers do not represent inventions or introductions of 
products or processes new to the market. They are more likely to be innovations new to 
the firm, sometimes considered as imitative innovations. Among all countries in our 
sample, Brazil is the most innovative country with 86 per cent of firms having had product 
or process innovations in the period under review. In second place comes South Africa 
with 82 per cent. Ethiopia and Pakistan have no information with respect to innovation 
output9. 
The survey contains two main questions regarding firms’ knowledge acquisition strategies. 
First, firms were asked to choose the three most important methods of knowledge 
sourcing out of a total of twelve options. The dummy variable BUY gets value 1 if firms 
chose at least one of the following three technological sources: importing machinery and 
equipment, hiring key personnel or licensing from abroad or domestically. Second, the 
survey has question related to firms’ R&D spending in the last year of the survey period. 
R&D expenditures covers all outlays (labour costs, materials, expenditures on tangible 
fixed assets) incurred for research activities that comprise “creative work undertaken on a 
systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, 
culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications” 
(OECD, 2011). The dichotomous variable MAKE takes value 1 if firms claim to have 
positive R&D spending during the period of the survey, 0 otherwise.  
                                                                                                                                                              
difference between the 75% value and the 25% value) above or below the median, which is about 6 
percentage of  total sample.  
8 A sample with less than 50 observations is unlikely to give us consistent estimates of  the country specific 
effect. We also dropped firms with its number of  permanent employee lower than 5 and the growth of  
sales per person greater than 300 percent. In total we eliminated in this way about 3% of  all the 
observations. 
9 This is not problematic since innovation output will not be addressed in the following analysis. Our main 
concern is the productivity performance. 
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<Insert table 2 here> 
Table 2 shows the count statistics of the appearance of each strategy and their interactions. 
We do not distinguish between higher- and lower-middle income countries, only between 
the union of those two and low-income countries. The statistics show that the main 
technology sourcing in low- and middle-income countries is external. Given the low levels 
of financial and human resources, firms seek innovation sources from external channels. 
There is about a 9 per cent higher frequency in pursuing the non-exclusive BUY strategy 
and a slightly lower probability of adopting the non-exclusive MAKE strategy in middle-
income compared to low-income countries. Turning to the exclusive strategies (columns 3 
to 6), we see that firms are more likely to adopt MAKE and BUY in middle-income than 
in low-income countries, 21.8 per cent versus 17.5 per cent. At a relatively higher level of 
development firms have probably accumulated some knowledge stocks and have gained 
experience that make them capable of doing in-house R&D and external BUY 
simultaneously. One should note that there are also other existing knowledge sourcing 
strategies, such as knowledge transfer from mother companies, learning from international 
conferences or study trips. We will not address these strategies here. 
4.2 Specification of the production function 
Table 3 provides the definition for each variable used in our empirical analysis. 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
Two sets of variables will be introduced in accordance with the two methods adopted in 
the empirical analysis, one for the PROD approach and the other one is for the MP 
approach. The dependent variable in the PROD approach is productivity, measured by 
sales per employee, in natural logarithmic terms. The standard explanatory variables in the 
production function (5) are: physical capital (total end-of-year capital per person in logs), 
labour (log of permanent workers at the end of the year). Sales and capital are converted in 
1000 USD. Besides the standard explanatory variables, we also control for differences in 
capacity utilization (in percentage) because firms are likely to be more productive with the 
same amount of inputs when they operate at a relatively high level of capacity utilization.  
Variable Export indicates whether firms had positive export sales during the last year. 
Here, we use Export to indicate the level of openness of the economy. Openness has 
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generally led to greater competition in the product markets and increasingly also in the 
markets for services. More vigorous competition exerts discipline on firms in developing 
countries. It therefore tends to strengthen incentives for development in their economy. 
So we expect a positive relation between export activities and firm performance.  
The ICS survey contains a series of information about the business environment in which 
firms operate. The business environment consists of government regulations, institutional 
background, or social conventions, which are believed to have a substantial impact on 
firms’ production decisions and performance (Coase, 1998). Questions are asked about 
obstacles to innovation on a four-point Likert scale. We select the infrastructure, 
regulation, and financial innovation hindrances and transform these variables in binary 
variables. The dummy variables Infra_obs, Regu_obs and Finance_obs take value 1 if the 
answer is marked as a major or very severe obstacle (scores 3 and 4). It is believed that 
these economic and institutional obstacles can play a significant role in explaining the 
heterogeneous performance in productivity across countries (Mohnen and Röller, 2005). 
Size10, industry and country dummies11 are used to capture the heterogeneities due to size, 
industries and countries.  
4.3 Specification of the knowledge acquisition equations 
Two categories of variables are expected to affect firms’ knowledge sourcing strategies. 
The first category is firm specific. It includes size and foreign ownership (Foreign-owner). 
Larger firms are expected to be more innovative and hence have more often internal R&D 
activities and external technology purchases. Most of the foreign firms in developing 
countries are more competitive than the domestic firms. However, empirical evidence has 
shown that in joint ventures the core technologies remain generally under the control of 
the foreign partners or company headquarters abroad (OECD, 2007). So, in general, 
foreign-owned companies are expected to be less likely to engage in innovation activities 
than domestic firms.  
The second category of variables is intended to capture the technological capability that 
affects firms’ innovation strategy decisions. Because information technology is commonly 
recognized as an important technological infrastructure to improve communication and 
logistics efficiency, IT is included in both the returns of both MAKE and BUY. Dummy 
variable ISO with value 1 indicates that the firm has received international certificates, for 
                                                        
10 Small firms: < 20 employees; medium size firms: 21-99 employees, large size firms > 100 employees. 
11 Four regions are included: European, African, Asian and Latin American countries.  
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example ISO9000, ISO9002 or ISO14000. ISO standards in general represent a reservoir 
of technology. In developing countries, ISO standards are important means both of 
acquiring technological know-how and of raising the capability to compete in global 
markets. ISO certifications to some extent reflect the technological capability and 
experience of firms. Training will be included only in the MAKE function. It gets value 1 
if firms carry out a training program for their employees. Skilled labour is an essential part 
of firms’ innovation capacity to accommodate and integrate the new knowledge into 
production and ultimately transform it into new products or processes. Dummy variable 
Edu_manager has a value 1 if the average education level of senior managers is above the 
university level. It will only be included in the BUY equation.  
Dummy variable Co_supply/customer indicates collaboration with suppliers and 
customers, which is believed to be associated with input quality improvements aimed at 
cost reductions or market expansion (Von Hippel, 1988; Tether, 2002). Co_university 
indicates if firms cooperate with universities and research institutes. It is generally 
associated with radical, breakthrough innovations that may open up entire new markets or 
market segments (Tether, 2002; Monjon and Waelbroeck, 2003). These two indicators are 
also widely used to measure a firm’s absorptive capacity (Zahra and George, 2002; 
Schmidt, 2005; Freel and Harrison, 2006).  
<Insert figure 1 here> 
Figure 1 depicts the differences in the mean values of the explanatory variables between 
low- and middle-income countries. Clearly, technological capability and institutional 
environment are heterogeneous across levels of development. The pattern exhibits that the 
mean values of technology-related variables are generally higher in middle-income than in 
the low-income countries. One exception in our sample is the managers’ education that is 
higher in the low-income group, which might be due to the differences in the education 
system across countries.  
It is worth to highlight the pattern of technological capability across different income 
groups here. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) suggest that firms learn from firms that have 
similar characteristics. Dussauge et al. (2000) and Cohen and Levinthal (1990) use the 
path-dependency theory to conclude that a firm is better able to acquire and use 
knowledge sourcing if it has some prior experience or higher technological capability. With 
low levels of development firms might be constrained by generally low levels of 
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technological capability. Hence, firms in low-income countries might rely mainly on 
external technology acquisitions. Additionally, the synergy effect of MAKE_and_BUY on 
productivity performance will be undermined by factors such as weak infrastructure, scarce 
financial resources, etc. The increase of technological capability will catalyse the speed and 
efficiency of absorbing external know-how; hence we argue that the complementarity 
between in-house and external knowledge sourcing strategies is expected to appear as the 
level of development increases. The last three columns in figure 1 show the mean values of 
the infrastructure, financial and regulation obstacles that firms face. At least the 
infrastructure and finance related obstacles are more severely felt in low-income countries.   
 
5. Empirical results 
This section discusses the result of empirical analysis of the role of technology sourcing 
strategies in affecting firms’ performance. Importantly, we would like to see whether there 
are synergistic effects between them. As shown in table 4, a simple correlation between 
MAKE and BUY regardless of any other differences in firms' characteristics gives a 
Pearson coefficient of -0.0017 (non-significant at 10%) for the low-income countries and 
0.1167 (significant at 1%) for the middle-income countries. This finding suggests an 
association between innovation sourcing strategies in middle-income countries. However, 
as stated before, the correlation observed here may be caused by the firm specifics. It is 
unwarranted to draw a conclusion at this stage.  
<Insert table 4 here> 
 
5.1 PROD approach 
Based on equation 5, we regress firms’ productivity (in logarithm) on the innovation 
strategies MAKE and BUY while controlling for other firm, industry and country 
specificities, which may affect the productivity performance. The results are given in table 
5. 
<Insert table 5 here> 
 
We separate the sample into two groups according to their income levels. The first two 
columns of table 5 are the results without interaction term between MAKE and BUY 
while the last two columns include it. Except for the technological sourcing variables, the 
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estimated coefficients of the other variables do not differ considerably when controlling or 
not for the interaction term.  
As shown in table 5, different patterns are observed across different income levels with 
respect to the determinants of productivity performance. The findings suggest that the 
elasticity of capital stock (Capital) to productivity is positive and does not differ 
considerably, 0.44 and 0.46 respectively for low- and middle-income countries. We found 
that there are in general increasing returns to scale in middle-income countries and, on the 
contrary, decreasing returns to scale in the low-income group at a 95 per cent significant 
level. Firms with higher utilization of resources and production capacity are more 
productive in both groups, and it is reflected by the highly significant coefficients of 
Capacity.  
Not surprisingly, when firms face severe obstacles in their production process, their 
production performance is likely to be hampered or delayed and the productivity 
performance is expected to be lower. Financial constrains (Finance_obs) depress 
productivity of firms in both groups, especially in the low-income countries, the estimated 
coefficient being -0.153 and -0.105 respectively. Infra_obs does not differ significantly 
from zero for both groups. The estimated coefficients of Regu_obs show a positive impact 
on the productivity across firms in middle-income countries. It might due to the fact that 
firms that face more regulations are more likely to spend more time in dealing with the 
regulation authorities (Mohnen and Röller, 2005). As a result, they may learn how to 
overcome these barriers more efficiently and benefit in terms of productivity performance. 
It may also be that obstacles are better perceived by more innovating firms, in which case 
obstacles might reflect innovation with more innovating firms being more productive. 
Exporting firms in low- and middle-income countries are respectively 54.8 per cent and 
20.5 per cent more productive than non-exporting firms. Entering international markets 
enables these firms to boost their productivity by interacting with buyers and also by 
coping with intensive competition in the export market. 
Regarding the effect of innovation sourcing strategies in firms’ performance, the results of 
table 5 present us the marginal contribution of MAKE, BUY and their interaction effect. 
Regardless of whether the interaction term is included or not, the estimators for BUY are 
all positive and significant in both groups. Especially for low-income countries, firms 
adopting external technological sourcing are more productive compared to those that 
participate in in-house R&D and those that are not involved in any innovation investment. 
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The result implies that in the context of a low level of development, firms investing in 
innovation through external channel are more productive and external sourcing strategies 
play a critical role in contributing to their performance. However, in the case of middle-
income countries, in-house R&D becomes significant.  
Turning to the potential synergistic effects between MAKE and BUY, the last two 
columns of table 5 show that interaction coefficients of MAKE and BUY are not 
significant in both groups. This result suggests that there is no complementarity observed 
between MAKE and BUY in fostering productivity. The return of adopting in-house R&D 
and external technology buying together does not differ from the sum of the returns from 
adopting them individually. Assuming there are no unobserved factors across firms, we 
can conclude at this stage that no complementarity is confirmed between MAKE and 
BUY. With the presence of an interaction term, external sourcing still plays a significant 
role across low-income countries while investing in in-house R&D seems to be more 
efficient in fostering productivity improvements across firms in middle-income countries.  
Practically, it is very difficult for economists to identify and control all the possible sources 
of heterogeneity across firms. So far our estimations of complementarity (or 
substitutability) are based on the assumption that no unobserved heterogeneities exist in 
the returns to MAKE and BUY. This assumption will be released in the next section. The 
Miravete and Pernías approach will enable us to distinguish complementarity and the 
association due to unobserved heterogeneity.  
5.2 The Miravete and Pernías approach 
The first two columns of Table 6 give the bivariate probit results of conditional correlation 
between internal and external innovation sourcing. The bivariate probit analysis assumes 
no synergy (bm = 0 in equation (8)). After controlling for observed heterogeneities, the 
magnitude of the correlation coefficients between MAKE and BUY decisions do not 
differ much from those the simple Pearson correlation coefficients that we obtained at the 
beginning of our analysis.    
<Insert table 6 here> 
The last two columns of Table 6 report the results from MP approach. In the presence of 
complementarity and correlation due to unobserved heterogeneities, the estimated 
coefficients of the exogenous variables are in line with those of the bivariate probit 
  20
estimation but slightly different in magnitudes. In the interpretation underlying equation 
(8) these variables explain the adoption of MAKE and BUY and their marginal returns.  
The firm specific factors have a significant influence on firms’ knowledge sourcing 
strategies. Firms with more employees seem to be more motivated to participate in both 
in-house and external innovating activities. Large firms are likely to have more resources to 
dedicate to innovation activities. Since in joint ventures technologies remain controlled by 
the foreign company headquarters abroad, foreign-invested companies are reluctant to 
engage in innovation activities by themselves. The estimated coefficients of Foreign-owner 
are negative but only significant in affecting MAKE for the group of middle-income 
countries.  
Firms with more technological capability are more profitable in adopting either of the 
innovation strategies. This effect can be reflected by the coefficients of technological 
variables. In the middle-income countries, IT and Edu_manager are positively correlated 
with BUY whereas IT and Training encourage firms to adopt in-house R&D. ISO 
coefficients are not significant anywhere and for the low-income group, none of the 
technological indictors is significant. Cooperative activities, (Co_supplier/customer and 
Co_university) are observed to stimulate firms’ MAKE decision in the middle-income 
countries and to reduce the purchase of external knowledge in the low-income countries. 
Collaboration seems to enhance knowledge, encourage own R&D efforts and reducing the 
need for external knowledge, substituting in a sense for technology purchasing. After 
including the complementarity coefficient in the system, the correlation coefficient 
between residuals is unchanged and insignificant in the low-income countries as it shown 
in bm, the correlation coefficient between the unobserved effects remains, insignificant in 
the low-income countries and becomes negative in the middle-income countries. No sign 
of complementarity exists in low-income countries. However, in the meddle-income 
countries the complementarity coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 99 
per cent confidence level. Hence in those countries it pays to do both MAKE and BUY 
simultaneously as is generally found in developed countries. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The lack of advanced technological competencies in developing countries requires 
innovation to occur through the absorption of existing knowledge and the adoption of 
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existing technologies. In the low-income countries, the low levels of technological 
capability severely constrains firms in their efforts to build up their own R&D stock of 
knowledge and make them rely instead on external knowledge acquisitions such as 
licensing, hiring skilled labour and purchasing technology embedded in machinery and 
collaborating with foreign firms. Our results highlight the significant contribution of 
external technological sourcing for productivity performance in the low-income countries. 
In the middle-income countries it is the combination of internal R&D and external 
knowledge acquisition that leads to a better productivity performance.  
These findings suggest that at different levels of development, governments formulate 
different policies in order to achieve optimal productivity performance. At a low level of 
development, external sourcing strategies are essential for local firms to integrate the global 
market. Governments should develop policies that encourage external sourcing, such as 
providing technological information and financial support for technology import. In 
middle-income countries, where firms have sufficiently built up their technological 
capabilities and gathered some innovation experience, government policies should focus 
on encouraging firms to invest in both internal and external technological sourcing 
because of the existence of a complementarity between them. 
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Appendix:  Likelihood function 
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2) when  < 0, inequalities marked with an asterisk of D(1,0) and D(1,0) in (10) are 
binding. The probability distribution will no longer be rectangular as the case of a 
bivariate probit.  
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Alternatively, the likelihood function can be written as: 
                                                        
12 Equation 4.a10 could also be written as 
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(A14)qji  2yji 1( j  b,m) 
(A15) si  qbiqmi  
(A16) vi  (si 1) / 2  
 
(A17) 
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Table 1 Innovativeness of firms in developing countries  
Country Year 
Observ
ation 
(firms) Income13 
Percentage of 
innovation 
Output per 
worker (log, 
1000 
USD/person) 
Capital per 
worker (log, 
1000 
USD/person) 
Labour (log, 
person) 
Brazil 2003 1463 Lower-Middle income 85.99% 2.58 2.03 4.00 
Chile 2004 306 Higher-Middle income 51.31% 3.70 3.69 3.90 
Costa Rica 2005 88 Higher-Middle income 78.41% 3.01 2.74 3.47 
Ecuador 2003 273 Lower-Middle income 75.46% 2.92 2.71 3.67 
Egypt 2004 582 Lower-Middle income 11.51% 1.47 1.46 3.37 
El Salvador 2003 280 Lower-Middle income 80.71% 2.69 2.60 3.79 
Ethiopia 2002 243 Low-income missing 1.51 2.16 3.64 
Guatemala 2003 371 Lower-Middle income 72.78% 2.41 2.19 3.58 
Guyana 2004 97 Lower-Middle income 54.64% 2.52 2.73 3.09 
Honduras 2003 323 Lower-Middle income 66.25% 2.19 1.98 3.28 
Indonesia 2003 466 Lower-Middle income 46.35% 1.86 1.76 5.23 
Lithuania 2004 74 Higher-Middle income 39.19% 2.18 0.94 3.79 
Madagascar 2005 79 Low-income 60.76% 1.50 1.65 4.11 
Malawi 2005 84 Low-income 64.29% 2.34 2.03 4.15 
Mauritius 2005 98 Higher-Middle income 72.45% 2.70 2.40 4.12 
Nicaragua 2003 308 Low-income 75.00% 1.77 1.73 2.95 
Pakistan 2002 845 Low-income missing 2.31 2.29 3.30 
Philippines 2003 582 Lower-Middle income 59.79% 1.97 1.57 4.16 
South Africa 2003 513 Lower-Middle income 82.85% 3.47 2.85 4.69 
Syria 2003 75 Lower-Middle income 36.00% 1.83 2.70 2.23 
Tanzania 2003 73 Low-income 49.32% 2.09 2.21 3.51 
Thailand 2004 1336 Lower-Middle income 64.97% 2.85 2.49 4.96 
Turkey 2005 454 Higher-Middle income 69.16% 3.54 3.32 4.20 
Zambia 2002 73 Low-income 72.60% 2.54 2.24 4.07 
                
Total   9086   57.67% 2.50 2.26 4.02 
 
Table 2 “Make” and “buy” strategies in developing countries 
Income level MAKE BUY 
MAKE 
ONLY BUY ONLY
MAKE 
AND BUY 
NO MAKE 
OR BUY Innovation 
Low-income 
countries 31.09% 56.54% 13.55% 39.00% 17.54% 29.91% 24.75% 
Middle-
income 
countries 28.84% 67.05% 7.02% 45.22% 21.83% 25.93% 65.28% 
Total 29.26% 65.08% 8.24% 44.06% 21.02% 26.68% 57.67% 
                                                        
13 Countries are divided according to 2011 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method 
(http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/world-bank-atlas-method). Low-income 
countries: 1,025 USD or less; lower middle-income countries: 1,026 - 4,035 USD; upper middle-income 
countries:  4,036 - 12,475 USD; and high-income countries: 12,476 USD or more. 
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Table 3 Definition of variables 
                                                        
14 See http://www.oecd.org 
Dependent variable   PROD MP 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Total sales /Number of long-term permanent workers, in 
1000USD, in logs   
Explanatory Variables    
Capital 
 
Total assets of firms (including Property, Plant and 
Equipment)/Number of long-term permanent workers, in 1000 
USD and in logs   
Labour Number of long-term permanent workers   
Capacity 
 
Actual output produced (1000 USD)/ Maximum output that 
could be produced with existing machinery and equipment and 
regular shifts (value between 0-1)   
Innovation strategy 
variable    
MAKE 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firms have own R&D activities 
and have a positive R&D budget  
BUY 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firms acquire technology through 
at least one of the following external technology acquisition 
methods: importing machinery and equipment; hiring key 
personnel; licensing  
Control variables     
Foreign_owner Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has foreign ownership  
Exporter Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm's sales are exported   
Edu_manager 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if manager have graduate school or 
above education  
Training Dummy variable equal to 1 if training programme took place   
IT 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firms use internet or have own 
website  
ISO 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has ISO (international 
certification)  
Co-supply/customer 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has cooperative innovation 
activities with suppliers or customers  
Co_university 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has cooperative innovation 
activities with universities  
Finance_obs 
 
Dummy variable with the value 1 if accessing to finance or 
costs of finance is a major obstacle to firm   
Infra_obs 
 
Lost value of sales due to power outages during last operation 
year, in percentage   
Regu_obs 
The average time of managers dealing with government 
regulations   
Industry dummy 
Definition of industrial categories and Low-tech industries 
from OECD14  
Country dummy Countries included in our study   
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Table 4 Unconditional correlations between innovation strategies and scale of investment 
  Low-income countries Middle-income countries 
  MAKE BUY MAKE BUY 
MAKE 1   1   
BUY -0.0017 1 0.1167*** 1 
       ***indicates the results is significant at 0.01. 
 
 
Table 5 PROD approach. OLS regression of equation (2) results without and with the 
interaction term 
  Without interaction With interaction 
Productivity 
Low-income 
countries 
Middle-income 
countries 
Low-income 
countries 
Middle-income 
countries 
Capital 0.443*** 0.469*** 0.443*** 0.468*** 
  0.020 0.007 0.020 0.007 
Labour -0.103** 0.064*** -0.102*** 0.064*** 
  0.044 0.016 0.044 0.016 
Capacity 0.517*** 0.514*** 0.522*** 0.511*** 
  0.139 0.054 0.139 0.054 
Exporter 0.548*** 0.205*** 0.541*** 0.204*** 
  0.073 0.026 0.074 0.026 
Finance_obs -0.153*** -0.105*** -0.152*** -0.105*** 
  0.053 0.024 0.053 0.024 
Infra_obs 0.055 -0.013 0.056 -0.013 
  0.051 0.022 0.051 0.022 
Regu_obs 0.045 0.084*** 0.044 0.084*** 
  0.056 0.023 0.056 0.023 
MAKE 0.015 0.160*** -0.074 0.207*** 
  0.057 0.024 0.082 0.045 
BUY 0.183*** 0.041* 0.133** 0.057** 
  0.051 0.023 0.061 0.027 
MAKE&BUY     0.156 -0.064 
      0.104 0.051 
Size_medium 0.364*** 0.225*** 0.369*** 0.224*** 
  0.077 0.034 0.077 0.034 
Size_large 0.510*** 0.318*** 0.515*** 0.319*** 
  0.158 0.058 0.158 0.058 
Constant 0.494*** 0.620*** 0.512*** 0.616*** 
  0.177 0.075 0.178 0.075 
Number of obs. 1705 7381 1705 7381 
Adj_R2 0.379 0.5434 0.3794 0.5434 
 
Note: nonmakebuy is the base category. Industry, country dummies are included. 
*** Significant level 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
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Table 6 Miravete and Pernías approach. Maximum simulated likelihood estimation results 
  Bivariate probit Miravete and Pernías (MP) approach 
  
Low-income 
countries 
Middle-income 
countries 
Low-income 
countries 
Middle-income 
countries 
BUY         
Foreign _owner 0.204 -0.111* 0.204 -0.087 
  0.140 0.063 0.140 0.060 
ISO -0.078 0.063 -0.078 0.047 
  0.110 0.045 0.110 0.042 
IT 0.137 0.349*** 0.137 0.281*** 
  0.093 0.034 0.093 0.039 
Co_supply/client -0.322*** -0.223*** -0.322*** -0.232*** 
  0.070 0.036 0.070 0.033 
Co_university -0.261 -0.366*** -0.261 -0.373*** 
  0.194 0.101 0.194 0.094 
Edu_manager -0.037 0.288*** -0.037 0.285*** 
  0.067 0.034 0.067 0.032 
Size_Medium 0.063 0.245*** 0.063 0.208*** 
  0.072 0.041 0.072 0.041 
Size_Large 0.258** 0.324*** 0.258*** 0.262*** 
  0.102 0.048 0.102 0.049 
Constant 0.100 -0.063 0.100 -0.037 
  0.092 0.060 0.092 0.058 
MAKE         
Foreign _owner -0.202 -0.205*** -0.202 -0.201*** 
  0.147 0.063 0.147 0.064 
ISO 0.102 0.058 0.102 0.040 
  0.109 0.044 0.109 0.045 
IT 0.064 0.513*** 0.064 0.452*** 
  0.095 0.035 0.095 0.041 
Co_supply/client -0.069 0.171*** -0.069 0.193*** 
  0.073 0.037 0.073 0.038 
Co_university -0.281 0.326*** -0.281 0.383*** 
  0.222 0.105 0.222 0.108 
Training 0.069 0.530*** 0.069 0.541*** 
  0.086 0.037 0.086 0.037 
Size_Medium 0.287*** 0.243*** 0.287*** 0.184*** 
  0.077 0.048 0.077 0.052 
Size_Large 0.336*** 0.331*** 0.336*** 0.256*** 
  0.107 0.053 0.107 0.059 
Constant -0.450*** -1.679*** -0.450*** -1.776*** 
  0.091 0.070 0.091 0.074 
Complementarity    0.000 0.279*** 
      0.004 0.084 
Correlation 0.035 0.101*** 0.035 -0.198** 
  0.043 0.022 0.043 0.089 
Number of obs. 1705 7381 1705 7381 
Likelihood ratio -2069.274 -8311.584 -2069.2744 -8306.2234 
Note: Industry dummies dummies are included. 
          *** Significant level 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
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Figure 1 Innovation sourcing strategies, firm specificities and institutional characteristics in 
low- and middle-income countries 
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